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SUFFERING AND THE WILL OF GOD 
John T. Edelman 
Talk of human suffering as the will of God is often taken to be either confused 
or corrupt. This paper suggests that it need be neither. The paper considers 
different senses in which suffering might be said to be the will of God and 
different objections to such talk. But the primary objective of the paper is to 
suggest a conception of suffering as grace, such that it will be intelligible to 
pray that suffering come to oneself (Juliana of Norwich) and intelligible to 
view as grace the suffering that comes to those one loves (Simone Weil and 
Francis de Sales). 
I want to consider the idea that a person's suffering might be the will of God. 
It seems that to many this idea is obnoxious, either because they think it 
confused or because they think it corrupt or because they think it both. But 
I do not see that it must be any of these, as though one who said that a given 
instance of suffering were God's will were necessarily guilty of either bad 
logic or bad morals. 
It may be useful to distinguish at the start between what might be called a 
"weak" sense and what might be called a "strong" sense in which a person's 
suffering could be said to be the will of God. 
In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that it is worse to do than to suffer injustice. 
That one's circumstances can sometimes be such as to limit one to a choice 
between the doing or the suffering of injustice is something Plato makes clear, 
I think, in the Crito. If such circumstances can arise, then just as Socrates 
says it is better to suffer than to do injustice, so a religious person might say 
that it is God's will that he suffer rather than do injustice. I am not concerned 
to demonstrate that such circumstances can arise, though I think that often 
enough they do. But even if it were agreed that Socrates is correct, and even 
if one were to translate Socrates' remark into the claim that it is God's will 
that one suffer the injustice rather than avoid it by doing injustice, still, the 
relation between the suffering and the will of God would be what I should 
call accidental. God, it might be said, does not will the suffering, but only 
the acceptance of it. Here is what I mean by a "weak" sense in which a 
person's suffering might be said to be the will of God. Virtue may require 
that one forego certain means of escape from suffering or even that one 
embrace certain sufferings as ethically unavoidable. But the suffering here 
can be called a misfortune-in God's eyes as well as in the eyes of the 
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sufferer. God, like the sufferer, we might say, wills the suffering only because, 
in a sense, it cannot be avoided. 
My interest is in a stronger sense in which suffering might be said to be 
the will of God-a sense according to which a person's suffering itself, and 
not merely the refusal to do injustice, is God's will. One might speak of this 
as a sense in which the suffering and the will of God are not accidentally but 
essentially related. But what is surely a very common attitude toward this 
sense in which suffering might be said to be God's will is found, I think, in 
this passage from an essay in The Journal of General Education entitled 
"Teaching Cognitive Moral Development": 
We begin with the showing of a film entitled "Hunger in America," a survey 
of different groups of people in the United States who are badly undernour-
ished. We see a graphic picture of a government official who says flatly that 
poor people are poor (hence undernourished) because they are lazy. We hear 
a farmer, whose children stare blankly at the photographer, explain that he's 
proud to be poor: God made him poor, and that's good enough for him. We 
view case after case of people oversimplifying the problem of malnutrition. 
Both those who are hungry and those charged with helping them make sweep-
ingly simplistic statements. I stop the film frequently and ask the students to 
examine the logic of, for example, the farmer's statement "God made me 
poor, and I'm proud of it." It does not take long for the class to see dualistic 
thinking among the people in the film, and in this case how such thinking is 
fostered by their churches.! 
It is enough for present purposes to say that by "dualistic thinking" the 
author means what he takes to be rather primitive moral thinking, the kind 
of thinking exhibited by individuals in the first and most basic of six pur-
ported "stages" in the development of ethical thinking. So he takes the 
farmer's statement to be inadequate to his own condition, simplistic or per-
haps just simple-minded. But when he wants to call attention to the "logic" 
of the farmer's statement "God made me poor and I'm proud of it," it is not 
clear whether he thinks there is some logical fault to be noted. I cannot see 
any blunder of a logical sort in the farmer's remark. But I can well imagine 
a kind of moral objection to what he says. One can imagine something akin 
to what Rousseau says of Christianity in the eighth chapter of the fourth book 
of his Social Contract: "Christianity teaches only servitude and submis-
sion ... True Christians are made to be slaves." Or one can imagine something 
akin to Marx's complaint against religion as the "opiate of the people. "The 
farmer's remark, one might say, just shows how religion-or at least "bad 
religion"-encourages an uncalled-for acquiescence in oppression and injus-
tice. Thus, the religious view that a man's poverty might be for him the will 
of God is morally objectionable. This kind of religion fosters "false-con-
sciousness," an inadequate grasp of the reality of one's own situation or 
condition. 
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But, of course, there is another possible objection to the farmer's state-
ment-a more straightforwardly theological objection. I mean the objection 
that often generates what philosophers call "the problem of evil": How, it 
might be asked, can a good God will suffering? Ought God not to work 
instead to alleviate suffering? Thus "the problem of evil": If God is perfectly 
good, He must want to abolish evil. If He is all-powerful, He must be able 
to abolish evil. But evil exists. Therefore either God is not perfectly good, 
or He is not all-powerful. And in either case He is not, then, God. 
I have noted, then, two plausible objections to the farmer's statement, while 
dismissing the idea of a "logical" objection to it. These could be taken as 
objections to the "strong" sense of the idea that a person's suffering is the 
will of God. I have characterized one of these as a moral objection, the other 
as a theological one. Yet neither seems to me to show that there must be some 
confusion or even corruption on the part of one proposing the idea that a 
person's suffering is the will of God. If for no other reason, this is because 
both objections seem to beg the question. To express moral indignation at a 
religious man's willingness to counsel patient acceptance of suffering is to 
have already construed that suffering as an evil to be avoided. And to object 
that a good God cannot will suffering on the grounds that He cannot or does 
not will evil is also to have construed that suffering as an evil to be avoided. 
But in one sense the question I mean to be raising is precisely this question 
of whether some suffering might not be an evil to be avoided after all. Indeed, 
if I suggest that some suffering might be the will of God, then I might as well 
be taken as suggesting that some suffering is not evil. So it is no good to 
object to the idea that God wills suffering by appealing to reasons grounded 
in the assumption that suffering is an evil to be avoided. On the contrary, it 
would seem necessary to retreat a step and ask why one resists calling suf-
fering a good. Put differently, why does one resist identifying suffering and 
the will of God? 
It may well be thought that an answer to this last question is obvious. I do 
not will that my children contract cancer, so how can I conceive of a good 
God willing such a thing? But not all thinkers have refused to identify suf-
fering and the will of God. In Agamemnon, Aeschylus puts these words into 
the mouth of the chorus: 
Zeus, who guided men to think, 
... has laid it down that wisdom 
comes alone in suffering.2 
Elsewhere the chorus remarks that "Righteousness so moves that learning 
comes only to the sufferers" (1.250). Agamemnon is at least in part the story 
of the sins of Agamemnon, and the story of the consequences of those sins. 
The wisdom and the learning of which the chorus speaks concern, I think, 
the limits of human power. Pride is the failure to recognize those limits. When 
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Aeschylus goes on to speak of "Righteousness" shining in the houses of the 
poor (1.772) it is plain, I think, that Righteousness shines there because the 
poor do not share in the pride that is the downfall of Agamemnon as well as 
the downfall of his wife Clytemaestra. It is in failing to understand the limits 
of human power that one is liable, in pride and "sinful daring"(see 11. 763-
770), to bring disaster upon oneself and one's children: 
The curse on great daring 
shines clear; it wrings atonement 
from those high hearts that drive to evil, 
from houses blossoming to pride and peril. (Ll. 374-78) 
Now if there is some understanding that comes alone through suffering, 
then it will be a kind of confusion to look for someone to have this under-
standing without the suffering. One possibility is this: there is an under-
standing that consists in the recognition of the limits of human power, and 
there is a suffering that necessarily accompanies and often occasions this 
understanding, namely, the suffering-the pain-one feels in running up 
against those limits. So the understanding and the suffering cannot come one 
apart from the other. Nor, of course, could one arrange for them to come to 
oneself-or to anyone else, for that matter. This point, I think, is particularly 
important; for in it one might see what could be called "the limits of asceti-
cism": Any kind of renunciation or penance or deprivation that one might 
arrange for oneself would indeed be just that, arranged for oneself, while the 
understanding at issue here is precisely an understanding of the limits to one's 
powers of arranging the world or one's own life in the world. I take it that 
this is part of what is at issue in the following remarks in Francis de Sales' 
Introduction to the Devout Life: 
If you wish to know which are the best sorts of abjection, Philothea, I tell 
you plainly that the ones most profitable to our soul and most acceptable to 
God are those that come to us accidentally or because of our state in life. The 
reason is that we have not chosen them ourselves but have accepted them as 
sent by God, and his choice is always better than our own. If we were to 
choose any form of humiliation, we should prefer the greatest, and those most 
contrary to our inclinations are such, provided that they are in keeping with 
our vocations. To say it once and for all: our own choice and selection spoil 
and lessen nearly all our virtues. 3 
Now if, as de Sales puts it elsewhere, "choice takes away the better part 
of our merit,"4 and if suffering, including what he calls "abjection," is the 
path to a certain wisdom, then in recognizing what I have called the limits 
of asceticism, one might recognize a motive to pray for one's own suffering. 
Mother Julian of Norwich, for example, prayed for her own suffering. But I 
shall return to this. 
So might not a man who says he is proud to be poor and that God made him 
poor be taken to be saying that he is proud to have been chosen for a certain 
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kind of understanding? A given individual might of course mean a host of 
different things with such a remark, and he might well be thoroughly confused 
in making the remark. But my concern is only to point to a possibility, the 
possibility that some suffering is not an evil to be avoided-or even to be merely 
accepted. I mean to point to the possibility that suffering can be a grace. 
If suffering can be a grace, then it can be seen as a gift from God, in which 
case it might be said that God wiIIed that we suffer. And saying this will be 
quite different from saying that some suffering is, as I have suggested above, 
ethically unavoidable and in that weaker sense "willed by God." But the 
suggestion that suffering can be a grace can itself amount to a variety of 
things. So, for example, it might mean something akin to "Adversity builds 
character." In The Consolation of Philosophy, "Philosophy" says to Boethius: 
Remember, too, that all the most happy men are oversensitive. They have 
never experienced adversity and so unless everything obeys their slightest 
whim they are prostrated by every minor upset, so trifling are the things that 
can detract from the complete happiness of a man at the summit of fortune. 5 
So we may agree that a certain amount of hard luck or misfortune is 
beneficial. But I am after a sense for the expression "Suffering is a grace" 
that is by no means identical to "Adversity builds character," at least if the 
latter is taken to mean that the value of the adversity or the suffering lies in 
the fact that it builds a kind of endurance that may be useful in the future. 
For on such an account of the "grace" of suffering it would appear that 
without future trials or hardship the suffering-the "preparation"-were idle. 
And if the endurance could be found in some other way then the suffering 
would be superfluous. Indeed, on such an account it might seem that suffering 
would not be a grace at all to one who already possessed whatever it might 
take to face life's ups and downs. But what I am concerned with here is the 
possibility of a grace that wiIl show itself precisely in the recognition that on 
one's own one cannot possess "whatever it takes" to face life's ups and 
downs. Here suffering wiIl be seen as a grace without reference to what the 
future holds. The suffering will be seen as a grace-a gift-not because it 
may prove useful in the future-in which case it also might not be useful-but 
because, as one might put it, the suffering brings one into contact with the 
truth. Doubtless, talk of "coming into contact with the truth" will seem more 
than a little odd to some. But the truth I have in mind here could be said to 
concern the contingency of the world, or the contingency of one's own being. 
It might be said to concern the finitude of one's human existence and powers. 
Such a truth might seem a counter-weight to our own tendency to pride, to 
the kind of pride Aeschylus depicts in the Agamemnon. Such a truth might 
also open the door to an understanding of the nature of God, or the nature of 
God's love for the world. Consider these lines from the first meditation in de 
Sales' Introduction to the Devout Life: 
SUFFERING AND THE WILL OF GOD 
Consider that a certain number of years ago you were not yet in the world 
and that your present being was truly nothing. My soul, where were we at 
that time? The world had already existed for a long time, but of us there was 
as yet nothing ... Humble yourself profoundly before God, and like the psalm-
ist say with all your heart: "Lord, before you I am truly nothing. How were 
you mindful of me so as to create me?" Alas, my soul, you were engulfed in 
that ancient nothing and you would still be there if God had not drawn you 
out of it. What could you have done in that nothingness?6 
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The suffering that shows me the limits of my own powers may also show 
me the role of "grace" in my life. It may show me that my life itself is a 
grace, as de Sales wants us to see in this meditation. And in this way it may 
show me God's love, God's love for me as a created being, a being that might 
not have been. 
Now I have not argued that the attitude that sees suffering as grace is the 
best or the correct attitude to take in the face of all suffering or, for that 
matter, in the face of any suffering. I have only tried to suggest how such an 
attitude need not be a sign of confusion. Still, there may be something in such 
an attitude that could lead one to call it corrupt. It is this: It is all very well 
for a man to view his own suffering as God's will and to call it a grace; but 
what of his neighbor's suffering? What of the poor man's children who "stare 
blankly" at the television camera? At this point, whatever understanding is 
supposed to come through suffering may begin to look less like understanding 
and more like the opiate of which Marx speaks, a kind of numbing comfort 
that enables one not only to tolerate one's own suffering but to tolerate the 
sufferings of others as well. The difficulties here, it seems to me, are many 
and great. So, for example, in the passage in de Sales from which I quoted 
above there is to be found no talk of "tolerating" even one's own suffering. 
On the contrary, in one of his letters to a woman suffering an undisclosed 
"illness," far from there being talk of tolerating suffering, he encourages her 
to "offer to suffer even more" and to "love and cherish these afflictions as 
coming from such a gentle hand"-the hand of God. Yet at the same time 
there is the direction that she do all she can to find remedies for her illness.7 
There may seem to be a contradiction here, and I shall return to that possi-
bility below. 
The central difficulty with respect to the suffering of others has, I think, 
been well put by R. F. Holland. In an essay titled "On the Form of the Problem 
of Evil," Holland discusses the possibility that one could see one's suffering 
as God's love, and he makes reference to Mother Julian's remark: "But freely 
the Lord giveth when he will; and suffer us in woe sometimes. And both is 
one love." Holland notes that among the gifts for which Mother Julian prayed 
to God was "bodily sickness in youth." He goes on: 
Someone who did not find this (prayer) incoherent might still wonder how 
far it touched the most difficult aspect of the problem. An attitude possible 
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for an exceptional person in suffering is not necessarily adoptable towards 
the suffering of another. Could Julian have wished that the serious illness 
which was to come to her should go to someone else? Obviously not.s 
But consider these remarks by Simone Weil in a letter to her friend Father 
Perrin: 
Goodbye. I wish you all possible good things except the cross; for I do not 
love my neighbor as myself, you particularly, as you have noticed. But Christ 
granted to his well-beloved disciple, and probably to all that disciple's spiri-
tuallineage, to come to him not through degradation, defilement, and distress, 
but in uninterrupted joy, purity, and sweetness. That is why I can allow myself 
to wish that even if one day you have the honor of dying a violent death for 
Our Lord, it may be with joy and without any anguish; also that only three 
of the beatitudes (mites, mundo corde, pacifici) will apply to you. All the 
others involve more or less of suffering. 
This wish is not due only to the frailty of human friendship. For, with any 
human being taken individually, I always find reasons for concluding that 
sorrow and misfortune do not suit him, either because he seems too mediocre 
for anything so great or, on the contrary, too precious to be destroyed. One 
cannot fail more seriously in the second of the two essential commandments.9 
Now the following entry can be found in Wittgenstein's Notebooks of 
1914-18: 
It is generally assumed that it is evil to want someone else to be unfortunate. 
Can this be correct? Can it be worse than to want him to be fortunate?IO 
And in the Nicomachean Ethics there is the suggestion that one mark of 
the greedy-and as such the unjust-man will be that he desires too many of 
those goods of fortune which, when considered unconditionally, are good, 
but which are not always good for this or that person. Aristotle goes on: 
Though human beings pray for these (goods of fortune) and pursue them, 
they are wrong; the right thing is to pray that what is good unconditionally 
will also be good for us, but to choose only what is good for us. II 
Does all of this introduce the possibility that love for another might involve 
the hope that the beloved meet with certain misfortunes? Not quite, I think, 
but very nearly.12 Here once more is Francis de Sales: 
I am beseeching God, my dear Daughter, to give you this holy patience; and 
the only thing that I can ask of him on your behalf is that he may fashion 
your heart entirely according to his liking so that he may live and reign there 
eternally; that he may fashion it, I say, with a hammer or with a chisel or 
with the stroke of a brush: it is for him to do as he wills, don't you agree ... ? 
Surely this is the attitude we should take. 13 
The attitude is one of willing that God's will be done. And it involves a 
recognition that suffering may be the grace through which His will is done. 
So that while we do not have here a prayer that someone will suffer, we are 
far from any conception of suffering as an evil to be avoided. Even here, 
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however, it will be important to remember de Sales' counsel to his correspon-
dent that she seek all available remedies for her suffering. If this seems 
paradoxical, it might seem less so when coupled with his suggestion that the 
best form of abjection is the form we do not choose. To fail to seek remedies 
would be to choose. On the other hand, to seek remedies in a certain spirit 
will be to fail to will God's will. 
It seems important to acknowledge here that even if someone could pray 
such a prayer as de Sales prays and be innocent of both confusion and 
corruption, it would not follow that just anyone could do so. At the same 
time, if not just anyone can do so, it does not follow that no one can do so. 
It is possible that certain ways of talking about suffering-and so, too, certain 
ways of praying about suffering-are available only to those who have them-
selves suffered, or suffered greatly. So that the same talk-or the same 
prayer-from the mouths of others will signify either confusion or corruption. 
This in turn suggests the possibility that one might have suffered too little to 
say or even to understand some things that are nonetheless true about suffer-
ing. It is sometimes suggested that only the comfortable can talk of suffering 
as a grace, and that if they suffered more themselves they would see that such 
talk is in fact a cruel lie. But perhaps it is only for those who have suffered 
greatly to see that the "lie" is true. 
Certainly it has not been my purpose to demonstrate that it is true. It may 
be that the best that many or most of us can do with these matters is to note 
what some others have said. No doubt, among the things that others have said 
will be prayers. So it is likely to happen that some people, perhaps aware of 
their own confusion or unclarity, and perhaps even acknowledging some kind 
of corruption on their own part, will nonetheless imitate those who have said 
those prayers in the hope that they, too, might learn to pray them without 
confusion or corruption. It does not seem to me that such an attempt to learn 
must itself be either confused or corrupt, even if it is the attempt of human 
beings who in many other respects are both confused and corrupt. On the 
other hand, like most learning by imitation, it is likely to be rather messy, 
and not always entirely successful. 
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